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There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent philosophical literature of the 
relationship between the minimalist theory of truth and the expressivist metaethical 
theory. The minimalist theory of truth, developed by Paul Horwich (1998) is a theory 
of truth the central theses of which are: The meaning of ‘true’ is explained 
fundamentally by the acceptance of a trivial schema T: 
T: <p> is true iff p. 
(In the schema, ‘<p>’ is short for ‘the proposition that p.’). The purpose of the notion 
of truth is to allow the formulation of generalizations such as ‘Everything the 
president said was true’ and ‘All instances of ‘p or not p’ are true’. Truth is a 
property, but it is not a substantial property of the sort that does explanatory work 
(beyond the fact of acceptance of the truth schema). 
One group of philosophers contends that this minimalist theory of truth and 
metaethical expressivism are compatible, the other group contends that such 
theories are incompatible. I will call the former position ‘compatibilism’ and the 
latter position ‘incompatiblism.’ The claim that there is such an incompatibility, I 
will argue, is based on a misunderstanding of the historical roots of expressivism, 
the motivations behind the expressivist theory, and the essential commitments of 
expressivism. I will present an account of the expressivist theory that is clearly 
consistent with minimalism. It is important to note that this is not simply, as it may 
first seem, a verbal dispute regarding the proper uses of the terms ‘minimalism’ and 
‘expressivism.’ Any such dispute would be of little theoretical interest. The concern 
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that I will address in this paper is a substantive one. Opponents of the compatibilist 
position have incorrectly overlooked a possible philosophical position. Regardless of 
the labels applied to such philosophical positions, the very possibility of these 
positions being correct ought not to be denied without sufficient argument and 
consideration of the complete array of metaethical views in logical space. 
Are Minimalism and Expressivism Compatible? 
Paul Boghossian (1990), Crispin Wright (1985, 1992, 1996), and John Divers and 
Alexander Miller (1994) have argued that the minimalist account of truth is 
incompatible with the expressivist theory of morality, the proponents of which 
traditionally have held that moral utterances are neither true nor false. The apparent 
difficulty here results from the view that the expressivist, in order to distinguish her 
view from those who hold distinct metaethical positions, must hold the view that 
moral utterances are neither true nor false. I will call this view of moral truth the 
‘Denial Thesis.’ Philosophers whose views were ancestors of expressivism, such as 
David Hume and A.J. Ayer1, have held the denial thesis, as well as (in certain 
writings) recent expressivist writers such as Allan Gibbard (1990). 
The apparent trouble with squaring expressivism with minimalism is that 
there is only a trivial difference, on such theories, between the assertion that p and 
the assertion that it is true that p. In discussions of moral matters, it is quite clear that 
utterances that have the appearance of genuine assertions are made, and such 
apparent assertions would seem to express true or false propositions regarding 
moral issues. A person may sincerely assert “Great inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth are unjust,” and such an ostensible assertion would seem to express the belief 
that great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust. 
However, given that the object of this apparent belief is the proposition that 
great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust, the minimalist would have 
to accept that such a proposition is capable of being straightforwardly true or false, 
pace the traditional expressivist view. It may still be possible for a minimalist to deny 
that there are in fact propositions expressed by these apparent assertions of moral 
claims. The most coherent position for a minimalist to hold is one according to 
which there are moral propositions, and thus moral utterances are capable of being 
true or false: In order to deny this, a minimalist would have to claim that these 
utterances do not have a propositional content, a meaning, and such statements do 
not seem to be meaningless. 
                                                   
1 I am not here claiming that Hume or Ayer is an expressivist in the contemporary sense. 
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According to the view that moral utterances have propositional contents, the 
following would be a legitimate instance of the minimalist schema: 
I: <Great inequalities in the distribution of wealth are unjust> is true iff great inequalities 
in the distribution of wealth are unjust. 
Thus, according to a minimalist account of truth, given the further assumption that 
moral utterances genuinely express propositions, such utterances must be either true 
or false. Such an admission is tantamount to the rejection of traditional expressivism. 
There are a number of reasons to think that rejecting this aspect of traditional 
expressivism would be a good thing. The claim that normative and moral utterances 
are incapable of being true or false does not fit well with ordinary practice. Speakers 
commonly attribute truth or falsehood to moral utterances. People generally 
consider utterances of ‘Rape is wrong’ true, and consider utterances of ‘It is 
permissible to attack strangers for fun’ false. Any philosophical qualms regarding 
the attribution of truth (or falsehood) to moral utterances do not seem to affect this 
practice of attributing truth values to moral utterances. 
There are number of related factors that tell in favor of the attribution of truth 
to moral utterances. Normative and moral assertions also have all of the same 
surface features as nonnormative and nonmoral assertions. Attributions of truth to 
moral utterances would be required to account for the role such utterances play in 
valid arguments. In order to have the possibility of a notion of moral knowledge that 
accords well with our ordinary practice, we would need to attribute truth to moral 
utterances. 
While minimalism would allow the expressivist to attribute truth to moral 
utterances, the aforementioned incompatibilist philosophers have held that 
expressivists who accept minimalism do so at the cost of their own theory. In “The 
Status of Content,” Boghossian presents a version of this incompatibilist argument 
directed toward the work of A.J. Ayer. Boghossian summarizes Ayer’s account of the 
redundancy theory of truth and his emotivist account of ethics, and claims that Ayer 
failed to recognize 
the tension between such a [redundancy theory] conception [of truth] and a nonfactualist 
thesis about a given range of assertoric discourse (Boghossian 1990, 163). 
The particular “non-factualist thesis” Boghossian has in mind here is Ayer’s 
emotivist account of moral discourse. 
Boghossian notes correctly that moral utterances fit many of the criteria for 
straightforward assertoric discourse of the sort to which one would attribute truth. 
Moral utterances are meaningful, declarative, and are embedded in sentences 
formed by truth functional connectives (conjunction, disjunction, negation, 
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conditionals) and within propositional attitude contexts. There is at least a prima facie 
reason to regard such utterances as being on a par with nonmoral utterances. 
Given that we have such good reason to attribute truth to moral utterances, 
Boghossian contends that Ayer’s redundancy theory and expressivism are in 
conflict. In order to resolve the conflict, one needs a more “robust” theory of truth 
that will allow one to distinguish moral discourse, which is neither 
straightforwardly true nor false, from other realms of discourse that can be 
straightforwardly true or false (such as, for example, physics). Boghossian writes: 
A non-factualism about any subject matter requires a conception of truth stronger than 
the deflationary: it is committed to holding that “true” stands for some real, language-
independent property, eligibility for which will not be certified solely by the fact that a 
sentence is declarative or significant (Boghossian 1990, 165). 
It is important to note here that this argument is framed in response to Ayer’s views. 
Boghossian (1990) objects to deflationary theories of truth on the grounds that a 
“nonfactualist” account of truth cannot distinguish between factualist and 
nonfactualist accounts of different discourses. One aspect of this argument is that 
certain deflationists cannot explain the use of the notion of truth to generalize over 
claims in a given discourse. This objection is not successful against minimalism 
regarding truth. Unlike earlier deflationary theories such as the redundancy theory 
of truth, minimalism allows that ‘true’ is a genuine predicate and truth itself is a 
property. As a result minimalism is not susceptible to this aspect of Boghossian’s 
argument. The question still remains whether, on a minimalist account, one can 
mark a distinction between factual and nonfactual discourse. 
The argument presented by Wright differs from that of Boghossian insofar as 
it is clearly directed at contemporary deflationists. Wright argues that any 
expressivist or projectivist account that allows for the attribution of truth to moral 
utterances will collapse into moral realism. In his review of Spreading the Word, 
Wright makes this charge against Blackburn’s quasi-realism. While not explicitly 
mentioning deflationism or minimalism, Wright notes that Blackburn’s account 
seems to pave the way for the attribution of truth to moral statements, a result that 
deflationists and minimalists ought to accept. Thus Wright is dubious of the 
compatibility of the attribution of truth to moral claims and expressivism: 
If it really can be explained—and Blackburn takes imaginative strides toward doing so—
how the moral projectivist can acknowledge the susceptibility of moral judgements to 
conditional and other forms of embedding, and even how we can have a worthwhile 
truth predicate for them, then, so far from vindicating a form of moral anti-realism, why 
has it not been explained how the moral realist can, in effect, cut past the epistemological 
difficulties which beset non-naturalism without incurring any obligations to furnish 
reductions? (Wright 1985, 318). 
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I will call this argument of Wright’s the ‘collapse argument.’ 
A more recent version of the collapse argument is clearly directed at 
minimalism regarding truth2. Wright contends that minimalism undermines both 
expressivism and the error theory of J.L. Mackie (1977): 
With each of these minimalisms in place, almost all of the areas which have traditionally 
provoked realist/anti-realist debate—ethics, aesthetics, intentional psychology, 
mathematics, theoretical science, and so on—will turn out to traffic in truth-evaluable 
contents, which moreover, when the disciplinary standards proper to the discourse are 
satisfied, we are going to be entitled to claim to be true. So two traditional anti-realist 
paradigms are immediately under pressure: expressivism—the denial that a target 
discourse, despite an apparently assertoric surface, really deals in truth-evaluable 
contents—is not going to be an option; and the error-theorist, like John Mackie on 
ethics…will have his work cut out to make the charge of global error stick… (Wright 
1996, 864). 
The collapse argument can be paraphrased without using the somewhat vexed 
jargon Wright uses. One of the main points Wright is making regarding 
expressivism is as follows: 
1. In order for expressivism to be a distinct philosophical position, there must 
be a significant difference between expressivism and moral realist positions. 
2. The only significant difference there could be between expressivism and 
moral realism is the different approaches taken by the expressivist and the 
moral realist to the attribution of truth to moral utterances. 
3. On the assumption that a deflationist or minimalist account is correct, then 
the expressivist ought to attribute truth to moral utterances in the same 
fashion as the moral realist. 
4. Thus, on the assumption that a deflationist or minimalist account is correct, 
expressivism is not a distinct philosophical position. 
The problematic premise in this argument is premise 2. There is at least one 
significant difference between the expressivist and the moral realist, namely, a 
difference in their view of moral ontology. Distinguishing the expressivist and the 
                                                   
2 It is worth noting that Wright uses the term ‘minimalism’ to refer to a different theory from the 
minimalist theory of truth I have discussed throughout this paper. The characteristics of Wright’s 
‘minimalism’ and the minimalist theory of truth that lead to the problem discussed here are identical, 
though, and hence it is reasonable to take Wright to be criticizing not only ‘minimalism’ (in his sense) 
but all deflationist and minimalist accounts of truth. Also, Wright claims that ‘minimalism’ (in his 
sense) is what all deflationary theories essentially amount to, or ought to be: “…minimalism about 
truth, as described in this and the succeeding chapter…is just what the deflationist trend comes to 
(what would-be deflationists like Horwich ought to advocate)” (Wright 1992, 12). For this reason, it will 
not be necessary for the purposes of this paper to go into great detail regarding Wright’s ‘minimalism’ 
and the differences between it and deflationary accounts when taking into consideration Wright’s 
arguments. 
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realist on these grounds has not been the standard approach in the metaethics 
literature. 
The Collapse Argument and the Semantic Strategy 
One possible response to Wright’s collapse argument is to suggest that the 
distinctive account offered of moral semantics by expressivists such as Blackburn 
(1998) and Gibbard (2003) is the element of expressivism that distinguishes 
expressivists from realists. It is this semantics that, contrary to premise 2 of the 
collapse argument, provides for a distinction between expressivist and realist views. 
James Lenman (2003) contends that the distinctive element of expressivism is its 
semantic view. Certain sentences in a language, according to Lenman, are truth-apt 
without further explanation. An example of such a sentence, according to Lenman, is 
“Everest is higher than Snowdon.” What is distinctive about an expressivist account 
of discourse is that such an account explains the truth-aptitude of the relevant 
sentences in terms of the semantics of non-truth-apt sentences. To use Lenman’s 
examples, the truth-apt sentence L1 has a meaning that, on an expressivist account, 
is spelled out based on the meaning of non-truth-apt sentence L2: 
L1: It is wrong to kill innocent people. 
L2: Hurrah for our not killing innocent people! (Lenman 2003, 57). 
This marks out a distinction between sentences with simple truth-aptness such as 
“Everest is higher than Snowdon” and sentences with explained truth-aptness such 
as L1. 
Does this contrast between sentences that are simply truth apt and those 
sentences that have an explained truth-aptness mark a difference between 
expressivists and realists? Is this sufficient to answer Wright’s collapse argument? It 
is hard to see how this would be so. Lenman’s semantic strategy may serve well as 
an account of a key element of expressivist accounts of discourse, but this strategy 
does not provide for a distinction between expressivists and realists. This is so, 
because it would be perfectly possible for a full-blown Moorean realist to agree with 
the expressivist on the explanation of the semantics of sentence L1, while still 
holding that moral realism is nonetheless correct. One could both be a nonnaturalist 
realist like G.E. Moore, believing that there exist non-natural moral facts, while also 
accepting semantics of the sort suggested by Lenman. A focus on semantics is beside 
the point of what distinguishes expressivists from realists, given that the latter is not 
primarily a semantic doctrine but a metaphysical one. For this reason, the semantic 
strategy alone is insufficient to answer the concern raised by Wright. 
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The Collapse Argument and Moral Ontology 
As noted above, the significant difference between the moral realist and 
expressivists is the distinctive account offered by expressivists of moral ontology. 
Expressivists have motivated their view by noting the distinctions between the 
metaphysical commitments of expressivism and realism. Blackburn, in his “How to 
be an Ethical Antirealist,” characterizes his “projectivist” view as an “antirealist” one 
due to the fact that such a theory involves explanations of moral matters that need 
not make appeal to moral facts and properties: 
This theory is visibly antirealist, for the explanations offered make no irreducible or 
essential appeal to the existence of moral “properties” or “facts”; they demand no 
“ontology of morals” (Blackburn 1988, 174). 
Gibbard distinguishes, in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, between naturalistic facts, 
normative facts, and facts of meaning. Gibbard then claims that there are no real 
normative facts: “In my own picture… [apparent] normative facts, will come out, 
strictly, as no real facts at all…” (Gibbard 1990, 23). In his recent book Thinking How 
to Live, Gibbard characterizes expressivism as denying that there are any distinctive 
normative states of affairs: 
There is no such thing as a specifically normative state of affairs; all states of affairs are 
natural…Then, clearly if my quasi-realism is correct, there aren’t distinctively normative 
facts, only naturalistic facts (Gibbard 2003, 181). 
How are we to understand this key metaphysical component of expressivism, the 
idea that there are no “irreducible,” “essential,” or “specifically normative” 
properties or 
facts? One might suspect at this point that the minimalist is in a poor position to do 
so—as James Dreier has suggested recently, there is an apparent problem of 
“creeping” minimalism (Dreier 2004). Minimalists who have been inclined to accept 
the minimalist truth schema have also been inclined, on similar grounds, to accept a 
minimalist property schema, a schema that claims that properties are the “shadow” 
of predicates. In his discussion of Gibbard’s Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Horwich 
has suggested the following property schema: 
For any object x, x has the property of being F if and only if x is F. (1993, p. 
74). If this is the proper minimalist approach to properties, then any theorist who 
accepts the appropriateness of assertions involving moral predicates will also accept 
the existence of moral properties: there is only a trivial step from ‘Inequality in 
wealth is wrong’ to ‘Inequality in wealth has the property of being wrong.’ 
Horwich offers similar minimalist schema for the proper understanding of 
facts, in general. According to following minimalist fact schema, 
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That p is a fact if and only if p (Horwich 1993, 74). 
This fact schema, like the property schema, seems to deflate entirely the ontological 
dispute over moral realism and moral antirealism. Any philosopher who would 
accept the truth of a first-order moral claim such as ‘Inequality in wealth is wrong’ 
would be committed as well, by the fact schema, to ‘It is a fact that inequality in 
wealth is wrong.’ Thus it seems that the minimalist is committed to the existence of 
moral facts and properties, and there is no significance to the dispute between moral 
realists and expressivists. This is the “problem of creeping minimalism.” If this 
indeed happens to be a problem without a solution, it would seem to vindicate 
Wright’s claim that expressivists, without the denial thesis, cannot mark a distinction 
between expressivism and realism. 
Dreier does not claim that the problem of creeping minimalism cannot be 
solved— He has suggested that there is, even taking a minimalist approach to 
properties and facts, nonetheless a key metaphysical distinction between 
expressivists and realists. Dreier’s suggestion is that the key to understanding the 
differences between expressivists and realists (specifically, nonnaturalists such as 
G.E. Moore) lies in their approach to explanation, and specifically to the explanation 
of moral judgments: 
Suppose that Julia sincerely asserts the sentence, ‘Knowledge is intrinsically good.’ She 
believes, then, that knowledge is intrinsically good. 
(J) Julia believes that knowledge is intrinsically good… 
What the “explanation” explanation tells us is that the division between [Gibbard and a 
non-naturalist realist such as G.E. Moore] must lie in their differing explanations of (J). 
According to a Moorean, (J) must consist in Julia’s standing in a certain doxastic relation 
to goodness…By contrast, Gibbard’s expressivist account will explain (J) by reference to 
the sort of planning state Julia is in: perhaps she has decided to include knowledge 
among her non-instrumental aims (Dreier 2004, 41). 
Thus, according to Dreier, it is in the explanation of moral judgments that the 
distinction between expressivists and realists can be found. 
As Matthew Chrisman (forthcoming) has argued, Dreier’s suggestion seems ill-
suited as a general criterion for distinguishing realists from antirealists. Chrisman, in 
his argument, raises the parallel question of how the cosmological realist, and the 
cosmological antirealist, ought to approach the explanation of the following 
judgment: 
(K) Joey believes that the planet Krypton is made of kryptonite. 
It is unlikely that either the cosmological realist or the cosmological antirealist would 
want to make an appeal, here, to the nature of the planet Krypton in explaining the 
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genesis of this belief. Thus, in the explanation of this sort of judgment, there is no 
distinction between the cosmological realist and the cosmological antirealist. In light 
of this, it seems hard to see how Dreier’s account can be generalized. 
A similar problem to the one cited by Chrisman arises in the case of 
explaining moral judgments. Consider Dreier’s original example, of Julia who 
believes that knowledge is intrinsically good. Perhaps she reached this conclusion 
because she heard it in a lecture given by an especially charismatic professor. It is 
not a conclusion she reached on her own, and if there be such a thing as intuition of 
the good, she has never taken the time to engage in it herself. It seems that, on a 
realist or an expressivist view, the proper explanation of her judgment would tell us 
more about the charismatic professor, and her effect on people, and very little about 
the ontological status of goodness. It does not, thus, seem that the explanation of 
judgment provides us with a clear criterion for marking the distinction between 
expressivists and realists. 
I think that there is an, however, important grain of truth in Dreier’s 
suggestion, one that is helpful to understand the distinctive metaphysical 
commitments of expressivists. This is in the suggestion that explanation is key for 
understanding the distinctive views of expressivists. I contend that, rather than 
focusing on the explanation of judgments, the key metaphysical element of 
expressivism is a view of the explanatory status of properties. While minimalism 
suggests that expressivists should accept the existence of moral properties (and 
facts), explanatory considerations mark the distinction between expressivists and 
realists. These considerations show how expressivism contrasts with the views of 
naturalistic and nonnaturalistic forms of moral realism. Explanation helps to cash 
out the expressivist denial of the existence of “irreducible,” “essential,” or 
“specifically normative” properties. 
The expressivist view of the explanatory status of properties is best 
understood in terms of a basic fact about explanation—explanation is asymmetric. 
There is a distinction between an explanans and an explanandum: the explanans 
explains the explanandum, but not vice versa. We can use this basic fact about 
explanation to mark a distinction between kinds of properties: “explanans” 
properties, properties that provide explanations for other kinds of properties, 
“explanandum” properties. These are relative notions: a property serves as an 
explanans with respect to a given explanandum property. Understanding the views 
of expressivists requires seeing how the expressivist would situate moral properties 
in a kind of hierarchy of properties, defined in terms of explanans and explanandum 
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properties. The explanandum properties could be thought of as being at a higher 
level on an explanatory hierarchy than the explanans properties3. 
One aspect of the expressivist view of moral properties is the aspect noted by 
Dreier: moral properties do not serve, on the expressivist view, as explanans 
properties for moral judgments. Another aspect of the expressivist view, one that 
marks a distinction between expressivists and naturalistic realists like Nicolas 
Sturgeon (1985), is that expressivists do not make appeal to moral properties as 
explanans properties in accounts of action: The naturalistic approach favored by 
Sturgeon, explaining Hitler’s actions based on the causal explanatory role of Hitler’s 
depravity, would be rejected on the expressivist view, for it makes an unnecessary 
“essential” appeal to moral properties. The best explanation of Hitler’s actions 
would be based not on the depravity of Hitler, but rather on facts regarding Hitler’s 
psychology and attitudes. Related to this matter, and to the debate between Sturgeon 
and Gilbert Harman, the expressivist would also deny the moral properties could 
serve as explanans properties in accounts of observation. To cite Harman’s famous 
example, the expressivist explanation of why a suitable observer would observe that 
setting a cat on fire is wrong would not be one that makes an appeal to the 
wrongness of the act. To sum these points up, the denial of there being any 
“essential,” or “specifically normative” properties is best understood, in part, as 
denying a role as explanans properties to moral properties. 
This denial of a basic explanatory role to moral properties might still not be 
thought mark out a clear distinction between expressivists and realists, for while 
naturalistic realists are committed to the idea that moral properties are explanans 
properties, properties that play an explanatory role in accounting for judgment or 
action, “non-naturalistic” realists such as G.E. Moore and Russ Shafer-Landau make 
no such claims about the explanatory status of moral properties. The non-naturalistic 
view is fully consistent with moral properties not being explanans properties, in the 
                                                   
3 It is possible for two different properties to serve as explanans properties for each other. If this is the 
case, it might be helpful to think of such properties as being on the same level on an explanatory 
hierarchy, but nonetheless bearing explanatory relations to each other. I will call this phenomenon 
‘lateral explanation.’ To cite a simple example, pain might provide an explanation for depression, while 
depression may also provide an explanation for feelings of pain. If this is the case, than pain and 
depression are each explanans properties with respect to the other, and on the same level of an 
explanatory hierarchy. That such lateral explanations exist does not undermine the use of an 
explanatory hierarchy to mark distinctions between views. For if a reductionist identity theory is 
correct, it would be correct to think of neural properties as being the explanans for each pain and 
depression. So, even if pain and depression are on the same level of the explanatory hierarchy, each 
could also be thought of as being at one level higher than neural properties. 
Minimalism and Expressivism | 19 
 
sense explained above. This might cause further doubts as to whether the 
expressivist offers a distinctive metaphysical position. 
There are two key differences, also best understood in explanation, between 
nonnaturalistic views and expressivism. First, on an intuitionist view such as 
Moore’s, moral properties are explanans properties, given that the existence of moral 
properties is an essential element in the explanation of moral intuitions. On 
intuitionist views, moral properties are explanans properties for intuition properties. 
Expressivists, who are skeptical of moral intuition, will deny this intuitionist claim: 
there are no moral intuitions, hence no need to make appeal to moral properties in 
the explanation of intuitions. A second key aspect of non-naturalism is that moral 
properties are “sui generis”: they cannot be accounted for in terms of naturalistic 
properties. Shafer-Landau, in his account, contends that moral properties supervene 
upon natural properties, but there is no explanation whatsoever of how this is the 
case—he suggests that the relation between the moral and the natural on his view is 
similar to the relation between the mental and the physical on Malebranche’s 
occasionalist theory. “The present view … requires something on the order of divine 
intervention to explain the intimate connection between something’s moral status 
and its natural features” (Shafer-Landau 2003, 78). This view is not one that is shared 
by the expressivist—as Simon Blackburn has argued (Blackburn 1971, 1984, 1986), a 
key advantage of expressivism is in its demystification of the supervenience of the 
moral upon the physical world. This explanation of the moral in terms of the natural 
world rests on appeal to moral attitudes—on the expressivist view, moral properties 
are explained in terms of moral attitudes, and hence are not sui generis. This is not to 
say that moral properties are identical to attitude properties: the latter can serve as 
an explanation for the former without the two kinds of property being identical. 
Blackburn’s idea that moral properties are “projected” on to the world, and 
Gibbard’s more recent theory that morality is accounted for in terms of states of 
planning, are instances of this sort of approach. We can summarize this aspect of 
expressivism by saying that expressivism allows for moral properties to be 
“explanandum” properties. 
Thus there is a metaphysical view distinctive of expressivism. Unlike the 
naturalistic realist, the expressivist denies that moral properties serve as explanans 
properties for judgments, acts, or observations. Unlike the intuitionist, expressivists 
do not claim that moral properties serve as explanans properties for moral intuitions. 
Last, but not least, the expressivist does not hold the non-naturalist view that there 
moral properties are not, in some way, explanandum properties—there is an 
explanation of moral properties in terms of moral attitudes. I will summarize this 
metaphysical aspect of expressivism, throughout the rest of the paper, by saying that 
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expressivists are not committed to robust moral properties, where a robust property 
is either (a) an explanans property in the relevant sense or (b) sui generis. The 
expressivist view denies both of these claims, holding the view that moral properties 
are nonrobust. 
Expressivism and the Error Theory 
While there is, in light of these considerations, an expressivist position distinct from 
realism regarding the metaphysics of moral properties, there remains a question of 
whether expressivists are able to distinguish their view of these matters from other 
anti-realist positions, such as the error theory of John L. Mackie (1977). As noted 
above, Wright considers the minimalist approach to truth a source of concern not 
only for expressivists, but also for error theorists as well. Wright charges “the error-
theorist, like John Mackie on ethics…will have his work cut out to make the charge of 
global error stick…” (Wright 1996, 864). This raises two issues. The first, beyond the 
scope of the present paper, is whether or not the case for the error theory is correct. 
The second issue raised by Wright’s concern is the issue of how expressivism might 
differ from the error theory. One might worry that the minimalist approach to 
properties discussed above fails to distinguish among these anti-realist views. 
This worry is unfounded. The minimalist property schema provides 
sufficient materials to distinguish the expressivist from the error theorist. One of the 
key commitments of the error theorist, unlike the expressivist, is the view that all 
moral claims are in fact false. Moral claims purport, according to Mackie, to refer to a 
realm of objective moral properties. These moral properties, Mackie argues, do not 
exist. As Mackie writes, the error theory is the view that “although most people in 
moral judgements implicitly claim, among other things to be pointing to something 
objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false” (Mackie 1977, 35). 
This is a more radical position regarding moral ontology than the ontological 
position of the expressivist. If the arguments presented above are correct, 
expressivists ought to claim that moral properties do in fact exist, but that such 
properties are not robust explanatory properties. The error theorist would part 
company with the expressivist by denying the existence of moral properties of any 
sort, explanatory or nonexplanatory. It is worth noting that the minimalist property 
schema does not commit the error theorist to the existence of moral properties. The 
schema is as follows: 
For any object x, x has the property of being F if and only if x is F. (1993, 74) 
Given that, for any moral predicate ‘F’, claims of the form ‘x is F’ are all false on the 
error theoretical view, there need be no commitment to moral properties on the error 
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theoretical view. In other words, by denying all claims of the form ‘x is F’ where ‘F’ 
is a moral predicate, the error theorist can also deny that any object whatsoever has a 
moral property. This kind of antirealism is also consistent with the minimalist 
property schema. Hence we can use minimalism about properties to distinguish 
between error theorists and expressivists. 
To sum up the points made so far, what distinguishes expressivists both from 
moral realists and from error theorists is the distinctive account offered by 
expressivists of the metaphysics of moral properties. Given the relevance of these 
ontological claims, and of the expressivist commitment to a distinct view of the 
metaphysics of moral properties, it would not be correct to hold, as Wright does, that 
the only significant matter of dispute between the expressivist and the moral realist 
is over the attribution of truth to moral statements. Perhaps, however, implicit in 
Wright’s argument is the claim also made by Boghossian, that expressivism’s 
commitment to a certain view of truth renders it incompatible with minimalism. In 
the quote from Wright 1996, it is worth noting that Wright presents as the entire 
definition of expressivism the claim that moral discourse does not “really deal in 
truthevaluable contents.” 
The position presented by Boghossian and Wright, according to which 
minimalism and expressivism are incompatible, is based on a particular account of 
expressivism. This account reflects the commitments of those philosophers who first 
articulated protoexpressivist views, such as Hume and Ayer. It is not often noted 
that these philosophers had accounts of truth and meaning that led them to conclude 
that the expressivist should refrain from claiming that moral utterances are 
straightforwardly true or false. It is also odd, given the amount that has been written 
over the course of the 20th century and into the 21st century on expressivism and its 
forbears, that Boghossian and Wright, in the arguments they present, implicitly take 
the commitments of Hume and Ayer as representative of the entire expressivist 
tradition. As I will discuss in the following two sections, Hume drew this conclusion 
based on the conjunction of his views on morality and a correspondence theory of 
truth, and Ayer drew this conclusion based on the conjunction of his views on 
morality, a redundancy theory of truth, and a verificationist semantics. The 
minimalist who rejects the correspondence theory of truth and the verificationist 
theory of meaning need not draw the same conclusions as Hume and Ayer. 
Hume, Correspondence Truth, and the Denial Thesis 
The metaethical theory on which I have focused in this paper, expressivism, is 
indebted to the account of morality in David Hume’s philosophy, especially the 
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great work A Treatise of Human Nature. In the Treatise, Hume argues for the view that 
moral attitudes are neither true nor false. Thus Hume, one of the ancestors of 
contemporary expressivism, was committed to the Denial Thesis. However, unlike 
more recent philosophers, Hume makes it clear that this position on morality is a 
consequence of two distinct theories: a metaphysical position on the nature of moral 
sentiments, and a theory of truth, a version of the correspondence theory. 
In the Treatise, Hume accounts for moral attitudes in terms of the passions, or 
emotions. Only a passion can move a person to act, according to Hume, and so any 
moral decision-making have as its basis certain passions. The passions, according to 
Hume, are dependent not upon the world, but on the mind of the individual making 
the moral decision. As Hume writes in the Treatise, 
Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of 
ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this 
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object 
of our reason. Now ‘tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions are not susceptible of 
any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in 
themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. ‘Tis 
impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc’d either true or false, and be either contrary 
or conformable to reason (Hume 2000, 295). 
 
If truth or falsehood consists of agreement between representations in the mind and 
mindindependent objects, as it does on Hume’s formulation of the correspondence 
theory, then it follows that Hume must deny that moral attitudes that consist in 
passions are capable of being true or false. 
Hume’s argument for the claim that moral attitudes cannot either be true or 
false may be summarized as follows: 
P1: (Semantic premise) Truth or falsehood consists in agreement or disagreement of ideas 
with entities resembling the ideas. 
As Hume states the theory, “contradiction” of truth “consists in the disagreement of 
ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they represent.” (Hume 2000, 
267). 
Such contradiction is evident in cases when one believes, for example, in a 
dream that one is sitting at a desk, but no desk corresponds to the idea one has, the 
mental representation of a desk. 
P2: (Metaphysical premise) There are no mind-independent moral objects, but rather only 
passions and volitions in the mind. 
Hume expresses this point as follows: 
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence; and contains 
not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or 
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modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that 
emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, sick, or 
more than five foot high (Hume, 2000, 266). 
From P1 and P2 it follows that: 
C: Moral attitudes are neither true nor false. 
Hume implicitly draws the conclusion as follows in a general statement regarding 
the passions: “’Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be 
contradictory to truth and reason” (ibid., 266-67). 
With the original argument for the Denial Thesis in hand, it ought to be clear 
that Hume’s argument is not sound if we reject a correspondence theory of truth. If 
we reject premise P1, the correspondence theory, in favor of a minimalist account of 
truth, it is clear that the conclusion C, the Denial Thesis, does not follow from 
Hume’s argument. The Denial Thesis follows from this Humean argument only on 
the assumption that Hume’s fairly simplistic correspondence theory of truth is 
correct. 
Ayer, Verificationism, and the Denial Thesis 
As I have discussed in detail above, in the section Are Minimalism and Expressivism 
Compatible?, one of the influential arguments for incompatibilism is presented in 
response to the views of Ayer. Paul Boghossian contends that Ayer failed to 
recognize the “tension” between the redundancy theory of truth and an expressivist 
account of ethics (Boghossian 1990, 163). Given that this debate has been framed in 
response to Ayer’s views, it is not solely of historical importance to investigate 
whether there was in fact a tension in the views Ayer presented in Language, Truth, 
and Logic. In fact, when Gibbard describes his view in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings as a 
“non-cognitivistic” one, given that “according to it, to call a thing rational is not to 
state a matter of fact, truly or falsely,” he cites in a footnote his debt to Ayer’s “non-
cognitivistic treatment of moral language…” (Gibbard 1990, 8). 
A closer inspection of Ayer’s account reveals that Boghossian is incorrect 
regarding the supposed tension in Ayer: The views presented in Language, Truth, and 
Logic are fully consistent, and Ayer’s case for the Denial Thesis rests on a view that 
minimalists need not accept, a verificationist account of meaning. Ayer formulates 
his version of the redundancy theory of truth in terms of propositions. Propositions 
are the bearers of truth and falsity. Ayer writes: 
…to say that a belief, or a statement, or a judgement, is true is always an elliptical way of 
ascribing truth to a proposition, which is believed, stated, or judged (Ayer 1936, 88). 
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That this is an important aspect of Ayer’s view will become clear when we consider 
his view on whether moral utterances involve propositional content. 
On Ayer’s account, the addition of the words ‘is true’ to an assertion does not 
change the content of the original assertion. These words are redundant. “When one 
says that the proposition ‘Queen Anne is dead’ is true, all that one is saying is that 
Queen Anne is dead” (cf., 88). There are many disadvantages to such a redundancy 
theory that are not shared by other deflationary accounts such as minimalism: it is 
quite hard to imagine how to formulate useful generalizations about true statements 
on such a view. 
What has not been noted sufficiently in the discussion of Ayer is that in his 
discussion of moral language, Ayer makes a quite strong, rather implausible claim 
regarding moral judgments. Ayer notes a difficulty with accounts of morality which 
make appeal to rational intuition as the basis for moral knowledge. If we take such 
an intuitionist view seriously, how do we determine which purported moral 
intuitions are the correct ones? If one person claims to know by intuition that 
sacrificing the life of one person to save the lives of five others is right, and another 
person claims to know by intuition that sacrificing the life of one person to save the 
lives of five is wrong, how do we decide which intuition is the correct one? It seems 
we have no way of verifying the appeals to intuition involved in ethical judgment. 
In the discussion of Ayer by Boghossian and the citation of Ayer by Gibbard, 
it is not noted that, in addition to a redundancy theory of truth, Ayer held a 
verificationist account of meaning. On Ayer’s account, an expression is meaningful 
only if it can be verified. Any expression that is not verifiable does not express a 
proposition, but rather a mere “pseudoproposition” that is not capable of being true 
or false. It is due to Ayer’s view that moral judgments are unverifiable—hence they 
express “pseudopropositions”—that Ayer held that moral utterances are incapable 
of being true or false. Boghossian overlooks this verificationist constraint—With 
such a constraint in place, it is clear that Ayer’s views on morality and truth are 
consistent. 
As was the case with Hume’s argument for the denial thesis, it is very 
important to note that the argument in Ayer from expressivism to denying that 
moral utterances are capable of being true or false rests on assumptions the 
contemporary deflation nist need not share. A minimalist about truth who holds a 
use-theoretical account of meaning would reject a crucial step in Ayer’s argument. 
Not being a verificationist, the use-theorist can reject Ayer’s claim that moral 
utterances express only pseudopropositions. Thus neither of the historical 
arguments from expressivism to the Denial Thesis ought to move a philosopher 
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convinced of expressivism and deflationism to hold that moral utterances are 
incapable of being true or false. 
Minimalism, Expressivism, and the Attribution of Truth 
The view that moral utterances are not straightforwardly true is a theory that is not 
required for a formulation of an expressivist theory. As I have shown in the sections 
above, Hume and Ayer drew the conclusion that moral utterances are neither true 
nor false from their commitment to, for Hume, a correspondence theory of truth, and 
for Ayer, a verificationist theory of meaning. A philosopher who holds neither of 
these theories will naturally draw different conclusions regarding the truth and 
falsehood of certain utterances. 
Regardless of the failure of the traditional expressivist arguments to motivate 
minimalists to accept the Denial Thesis, one can still ask whether this thesis is 
nonetheless an essential element of the expressivist theory. In order to see whether 
this is the case we must look to the arguments that have motivated expressivism as 
well as the details of the theory. If neither the motivations behind expressivism nor 
the details of the theory is in conflict with minimalism, then it is clear that the case 
for incompatibilism is a failure. 
The crucial motivations behind expressivist views, historically, are as 
follows. First, expressivists are motivated by a view on the metaphysics of morality. 
Expressivists have denied, as I have explained above, the existence of robust moral 
properties. The other crucial motivation behind expressivism is that expressivists 
want an account of moral language that can explain the close tie between moral 
attitudes and motivation. This aspect of expressivism has a historical lineage 
beginning with the work of Hume cited above, particularly Hume’s claim that the 
passions alone can motivate, and reason, without a passion, cannot. Due to this 
account of motivation, expressivists have claimed that moral utterances serve the 
purpose of expressing some mental state that plays a role in leading to motivation, 
such as an emotional reaction, a desire, acceptance of a norm, or what Gibbard 
(2003) calls planning. 
The minimalist account of truth shows the possibility of a coherent position 
that is consistent with these motivations behind expressivism while allowing for the 
possibility that moral utterances are capable of being true or false. It is possible for 
the expressivist to hold the view that there are no robust moral properties as well as 
the view that moral utterances serve to express desires (or similar mental states) 
independently of any commitments on a particular account of truth. 
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There is no inconsistency between holding that moral utterances are 
straightforwardly true and holding that there are no robust properties picked out by 
moral predicates such as ‘right,’ ‘just,’ ‘good,’ and ‘evil.’ It should be clear that one’s 
stance regarding the existence robust moral properties and facts is not automatically 
settled by answering the question of whether truth ought to be attributed to moral 
utterances. On the minimalist theory, truth could be attributed to an utterance such 
as ‘Killing is wrong’ regardless of whether wrongness is a robust property. All that is 
required is that wrongness is a property according to the minimalistic property 
schema. What does determine whether or not truth should be attributed to 
utterances of ‘Killing is wrong’ is whether killing is wrong. If wrongness is 
predicated of killing, it is not necessarily the case that a robust property is being 
attributed to killing. It is a separate matter whether we can make an explanatory 
appeal to the wrongness of killing to explain whether the wrongness of such acts is 
what causes people not to commit them, or whether it is the wrongness of killing 
that explains our knowing that killing is wrong. One could hold that killing is wrong 
yet deny any such explanatory claims. So, if wrongness is attributed to killing, then 
(by the deflationary schema), there is a true attribution of wrongness to killing. This 
does not, for reasons discussed above, imply that wrongness need be a robust property. 
The issue of whether moral attitudes consist of beliefs only, desires only, or 
some combination of the two is independent both of this metaphysical issue and the 
matter of whether truth ought to be attributed to moral utterances. The major 
question regarding moral psychology is the question of what sort of mental events 
are involved in moral thinking. Can one, as Hume (2000) famously claimed, never be 
motivated by a belief alone, without any passion? If so, do all moral attitudes 
essentially involve emotions or desires? On the other hand, given the resemblance 
between certain kinds of moral talk and other language that serves to express beliefs, 
should we hold that moral claims generally express beliefs? Or, is it possible that our 
moral attitudes are some combination of both beliefs and desires? 
Is this issue of moral psychology, the issue of the nature of moral attitudes, 
an issue that is inseparable from the issue of moral metaphysics? Is it possible to 
combine distinct views on moral psychology with various views on metaphysics? 
Can we only have moral beliefs if moral utterances are straightforwardly true and 
there are robust moral properties? Would claiming that there are merely moral 
desires but no moral beliefs preclude the attribution of straightforward truth to 
moral utterances, and lead us to deny the existence of robust moral properties? 
There are three possible views one could hold regarding moral attitudes: (1) 
Moral attitudes consist in desires alone; (2) Moral attitudes consist in beliefs and 
desires; (3) Moral attitudes consist in beliefs. I will consider views 2 and 3 first. On 
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either of these views, it is clear that holding such a view of moral psychology does 
not automatically settle the issues of moral truth or moral metaphysics. It is possible 
to have beliefs about both robust properties and nonrobust properties. Consider 
other properties that may or may not play a basic explanatory role, such as color. It 
is a subject of debate in philosophy whether colors are objective properties, 
properties that can be invoked in explanations of color perceptions, or whether color 
properties are subjective properties, projections from perceivers onto the world. In 
either case, it is clear that we can have beliefs about colors: We can believe a certain 
object is blue. Such a belief is true or false depending on the circumstances. 
Therefore, one can combine the view that there are color beliefs with the view that 
colors are nonrobust properties as well as the view the colors are robust properties. 
What if view 1, the theory that moral attitudes consist in having desires, is 
correct? Many philosophers who have been inclined toward such a view have had 
difficulty explaining the apparent belief-like nature of moral attitudes. It seems 
intuitive to describe a person who is against the genocide in Darfur as a person who 
believes the genocide in Darfur is wrong. For this reason, philosophers such as 
Simon Blackburn have acknowledged that moral attitudes, while essentially desires, 
often have belief-like characteristics. Such states are “quasi-beliefs” or “pseudo-
beliefs”: While they are not genuine beliefs, they are sufficiently belief-like to play a 
similar role. 
If one is sufficiently motivated by the Humean considerations cited above to 
hold view 1, and deny the possibility of any moral beliefs, then one can appeal to 
such a notion of “quasi-belief” to articulate a range of positions on moral truth and 
moral metaphysics. Perhaps, as A.J. Ayer claims, moral attitudes are not sufficiently 
belief-like to have propositional contents; hence there are no moral truths. Perhaps, 
as Blackburn claims, moral attitudes are similar enough to beliefs that we can 
consider such attitudes capable of being assessed as true or false. 
In a similar vein, if a philosopher who denies the existence of genuine moral 
beliefs holds that moral commitments are nonetheless “quasi-beliefs,” such a 
philosopher can take a range of positions on whether such “quasi-beliefs” denote 
properties. Perhaps these “quasibeliefs” denote robust properties or perhaps they 
may denote non-robust properties. There is a range of options here, and the position 
one takes regarding these options is not settled simply by claiming that moral 
attitudes consist of desires alone. Insufficient thought has been given to the array of 
positions in logical space. 
In light of this consideration of the central metaphysical and psychological 
thesis of expressivism, it ought to be clear that there is no incompatibility between 
minimalism and these theses. 
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Can this Dispute Be Resolved? 
It is possible that at this point in the debate, due to the fact that expressivists have 
traditionally assumed that moral utterances are incapable of being true or false, a 
philosopher could deny that the position I sketched above is in fact an expressivist 
position. One would have to ask at this point whether this is a substantial dispute 
regarding the motivations behind expressivist theories, and the details of the theory 
as spelled out by its proponents, or whether this is a purely verbal dispute about the 
proper use of the philosophical term ‘expressivism.’ 
Such a philosopher might present a convincing reason for thinking that the 
position I have sketched above is not an open option. If this were to happen, such an 
argument would be an argument about the substance of the issue, and would not be 
a purely verbal dispute. If, on the other hand, a philosopher does not give a reason 
to think that this position is not an open option, and merely insists on a certain 
restricted use of the philosophical term ‘expressivism,’ then this philosopher making 
a purely verbal point. If this were to happen, I would simply cede the term 
‘expressivism’ to my opponent. My concern in this paper has been to discuss the 
relationship between deflationary and minimalist theories of truth and a metaethical 
account of the kind proposed by Stevenson, Gibbard, Blackburn, and other 
philosophers. If necessary, I could phrase the question posed in this paper as the 
question of whether an account of the kind presented by these philosophers is 
consistent with deflationism and minimalism. Another approach, proposed by 
Horwich (1993), would be to suggest that an account of this kind is a revision of 
expressivism, a revision that has advantages over its traditional expressivist 
predecessors. Either strategy, it seems, would successfully answer this worry. The 
most reasonable formulation of an expressivist theory of ethics would embrace a 
minimalist account of truth, and it ought to be clear that none of the incompatibilist 
arguments would successfully prevent the marriage of expressivism and 
minimalism. 
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Abstract. There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent philosophical literature of 
the relationship between the minimalist theory of truth and the expressivist metaethical 
theory. One group of philosophers contends that minimalism and expressivism are 
compatible, the other group contends that such theories are incompatible.  Following Simon 
Blackburn (manuscript), I will call the former position ‘compatibilism’ and the latter position 
‘incompatiblism.’  Even those compatibilist philosophers who hold that there is no conflict or 
tension between these two theories—minimalism and expressivism—typically think that 
some revision of minimalism is required to accommodate expressivism.  The claim that there 
is such an incompatibility, I will argue, is based on a misunderstanding of the historical roots 
of expressivism, the motivations behind the expressivist theory, and the essential 
commitments of expressivism.  I will present an account of the expressivist theory that is 
clearly consistent with minimalism. 
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